

# Health Care Cybersecurity Preparedness and Response for the Enterprise and Industry

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# **Health Sector Coordinating Council**

## **Cybersecurity Working Group**

### **Presentation to the California Hospital Association 2023 Disaster Planning Conference October 4, 2023**

#### **Health Care Cybersecurity Preparedness and Response**

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**Cyber Resiliency Program Manager**

**HSCC OCCI Task Group Co-Author**

**St. Luke's Health System**

# The Health Care Industry is Critical Infrastructure

Systems and assets, whether physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the[ir] incapacitation or destruction ... would have a debilitating impact on security, ... economic security, ... public health or safety, or any combination of those matters.

§1016(e) of the USA Patriot Act of 2001  
(42 U.S.C. §5195c(e))





# The Interconnected Healthcare Ecosystem

## Laboratories, Blood & Pharmaceuticals

Pharmaceutical Manufacturers  
Drug Store Chains  
Pharmacists' Associations  
Public and Private Laboratory  
Associations  
Blood Banks

## Medical Materials

Medical Equipment & Supply  
Manufacturing & Distribution  
Medical Device Manufacturers

## Health Information Technology

Medical Research Institutions  
Information Standards Bodies  
Electronic Medical Record System and  
Other Clinical Medical System Vendors

## Federal Response & Program Offices

Coordinated Response Activities  
Under Emergency Support Function 8  
Government Coordinating Council  
Federal Partners (e.g., HHS, DoD,  
other sector partners)

## Direct Patient Care

Healthcare Systems  
Professional Associations  
Medical Facilities  
Emergency Medical Services  
Consumer Devices \ BYOD

## Mass Fatality Management Services


Cemetery, Cremation, Morgue, and  
Funeral Homes  
Mass Fatality Support Services (e.g.,  
coroners, medical examiners, forensic  
examiners, & psychological support  
personnel)

## Health Plans and Payers

Health Insurance Companies & Plans  
Local and State Health Departments  
State Emergency Health Organizations


## Public Health

Governmental Public Health Services  
Public Health Networks





# The Health Care Ecosystem – Connected, Digitized and Portable



# Cyber Pandemic in the Health Sector

## Data Breaches

### **HHS Office for Civil Rights, which enforces the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) data breach reporting:**

- Healthcare data breaches of 500 or more records (name, address, medical, and financial records) increased from 329 to 715 between 2017 and 2021, with the number of individuals affected ranging between 20 million and 50 million
- In 2022, there were 707 data breaches, more than half of which occurred against third-party Business Associates
- Of the 52 million data records exposed in 2022, 43.9 or 84% were caused by hacking

## *Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), from 2016 to 2021:*

- 374 ransomware attacks on US healthcare delivery organizations exposed the protected health information of nearly 42 million patients.
- The annual number of ransomware attacks more than doubled from 43 to 91.
  - Almost half of ransomware attacks disrupted the delivery of health care, with common disruptions including:
    - electronic system downtime
    - cancellations of scheduled care
    - ambulance diversion

# Cyber Pandemic in the Health Sector: Ransomware (cont.)

*Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), from 2016 to 2021:*

- Ransomware attacks on healthcare delivery organizations increasingly are:
  - Affecting large organizations with multiple facilities
  - Exposing the PHI of more patients
  - Less likely to be restored from data backups
  - More likely to exceed mandatory reporting timelines, and
  - Increasingly associated with delays or cancellations of scheduled care



# Cyber Pandemic in the Health Sector Costs

## *IBM Cost of a Data Breach 2022 report:*

- For the 12<sup>th</sup> year in a row, the health sector had the highest costs for a data breach, followed by
  - Financial
  - Pharmaceuticals
  - Technology
  - Energy
- The average breach cost in health care increased by nearly \$1M and is now \$10.1M
- Costs have also increased by over 40% in the last two years

# Medical Device Risks

A patient bed has an average of 15 medical devices.

A 500 bed hospital could have **7,500 devices** . Most of them **connect to the network**.

- Most hospitals have ‘networked’ medical devices over 8-10 years old.
- The security-related components in these devices pose a cyber risk
  - The operating systems and microcontrollers no longer receive maintenance or security patches from the component vendor i.e. “Not Supported by Vendor”
  - Often have common passwords set by the manufacturer that cannot be changed.
  - Often have unencrypted hard drives
- Time and cost to update these devices is very expensive

# Cybersecurity Attacks in Health Care

NEWS

## 'We weren't ready' — Inside St. Michael Medical Center during October cyberattack outages

### CommonSpirit Health Suffers IT Outages, EHR Downtime at Multiple Hospitals

Multiple hospitals within the CommonSpirit Health system, one of the nation's largest nonprofit healthcare systems, are reporting IT outages and EHR downtime.



### 'Just a crazy day': More than 30 systems hit by major network crash at The Ottawa Hospital

## Ransomware attack delays patient care at hospitals across the U.S.

CHI Memorial Hospital in Tennessee, some St. Luke's hospitals in Texas and Virginia Mason Franciscan Health in Seattle all have announced they were affected.

THE CYBERSECURITY 202

## An 'unprecedented' hospital system hack disrupts health-care services

### UVM Health Delays Epic EHR Implementation After Cyberattack, COVID-19

One of 2020's worst cyberattacks resulted in UVM Health delaying its Epic EHR implementation schedule.

LOCAL NEWS

### St. Joseph's/Candler outage continues after ransomware attack

### St. Anne Hospital in Burien suffering outages due to recent IT hacking incident

## Doctor says IT downtimes 'recipe for disaster' for ER patient care



### Cyberattack Hits Brooklyn Hospitals That Serve Poor New Yorkers

Since late November, medical professionals have been using pen and paper as experts work to get the facilities fully back online.

HEALTH

## MercyOne sites open but online scheduling canceled after national cyberattack

### Patients of a Vermont Hospital Are Left 'in the Dark' After a Cyberattack

A wave of damaging attacks on hospitals upended the lives of patients with cancer and other ailments. "I have no idea what to do," one said.

LOCAL NEWS

### Settlement: Scripps Health agrees to pay \$3.5 million to patients affected in 2021 data breach

Nearly 1.2 million current and former patients at Scripps had their information compromised in the May 2021 ransomware attack.

6 FEB 2023 NEWS

## Major Florida Hospital Shuts Down Networks, Ransomware Attack Suspected

# HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY TASK FORCE

June 2017

## HEALTHCARE CYBERSECURITY IS IN CRITICAL CONDITION

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### Severe Lack of Security Talent

The majority of health delivery orgs lack full-time, qualified security personnel

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### Legacy Equipment

Equipment is running on old, unsupported, and vulnerable operating systems.

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### Premature/Over-Connectivity

'Meaningful Use' requirements drove hyper-connectivity without secure design & implementation.

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### Vulnerabilities Impact Patient Care

One security compromise shut down patient care at Hollywood Presbyterian and UK Hospitals

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### Known Vulnerabilities Epidemic

One legacy, medical technology had over 1,400 vulnerabilities



# Cybersecurity Objectives

**CWG Task Groups were formed to implement the**

**2017 Healthcare Industry Cyber Security Task Force Imperatives:**

1. Define and streamline leadership, governance, and expectations for healthcare industry cybersecurity.
2. Increase the security and resilience of medical devices and health IT
3. Develop the healthcare workforce capacity necessary to prioritize and ensure cybersecurity awareness and technical capabilities
4. Increase healthcare industry readiness through improved cybersecurity awareness and education
5. Identify mechanisms to protect R&D efforts and intellectual property from attacks and exposure
6. Improve information sharing of industry threats, risks, and mitigations




# Cybersecurity Events = Extended Downtimes



## Why Health Care

- Reliance on technology creates vulnerability
- Limited preparedness for large scale cybersecurity attacks
- Operating in downtime creates increased risk



## Common Impacts

- Limited executive support for cyber security and downtime preparedness
- 1-2 weeks complete network outage
- Average time without electronic medical record - 21 days
- Downtime processes insufficient to support extended outage




## Network Dependency

- **Documentation:** EMR, procedure orders, patient education,
- **Priority Applications:** pharmaceuticals, imaging, cardiac monitoring, etc.
- **Resources:** supply movement, printers, telephones, email

# Emergency Management & Cybersecurity Response




## FIVE FUNCTIONS OF THE NIST CYBERSECURITY FRAMEWORK



# Coordinated Healthcare Incident Response Plan (CHIRP)

- Plan a template to guide the response to a large-scale cybersecurity incident
- Platform to unite Cyber Security / Information Technology response plans and Hospital EOP's
- Leveraged as a stand-alone document or a supporting document to other supplemental plans
- Available here: [HIC-CHIRP-FINAL 1.pdf](https://healthsectorcouncil.org/HIC-CHIRP-FINAL_1.pdf) ([healthsectorcouncil.org](https://healthsectorcouncil.org))



# Operational Continuity – Cyber Incident (OCCI) Checklist

The intent of this OCCI Checklist is to provide organizations of all sizes with key actionable and vetted steps that can be put into place at the first sign of a cybersecurity incident.




## Action Driven

**Provides  
Operational  
Tasks for the  
first 0-8 hours  
of an incident**



## Scalable

**Applicable for all  
healthcare  
settings  
  
Critical Access  
to Large Health  
Systems**



## Role Based

**Aligned with  
the Hospital  
Incident  
Command  
System**

# OCCI Elements



**Editable  
Collection of  
Incident Response  
Guides**



**Priority actions  
for the first 8  
hours of a large-  
scale Cyber  
Security Event**



**Actionable items  
that allows HICS  
respond quickly**

Available here: [Operational Continuity – Cyber Incident \(OCCI\) - Health Sector Council](#)

Version 2.0 released soon through partnership between HSCC and 405(d) Program and HHS

Response Guideline	
<b>Cybersecurity/Technology System Prolonged Massive Disruption or Outage</b> <i>This checklist outlines recommended initial (first 12 hours) actions and considerations during cybersecurity incidents</i>	
Command positions should be activated as they are needed. If a command position is not activated, actions fall to the Incident Commander and can be delegated as appropriate. Position activation may depend on staff availability or the size and scope of the incident.	
Based on assessment by CIO, CISO, and senior leadership, incident command may be activated Threshold for activation:	
<b>A prolonged massive disruption</b> meets or has the potential to meet any of the following: <ol style="list-style-type: none"> <li>a. Patient safety and/or member service impacts</li> <li>b. Large-scale clinical workflow, patient care, and/or member service impacts</li> <li>c. Implementation of preventative defenses that could impact clinical workflow</li> </ol>	
Incident Commander	
<i>Role: Provides overall strategic direction on all site-specific response actions and activities.</i>	
1.1	Identify Incident scope and obtain situational awareness <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Identify Scope – One site/multiple sites/Isolated outage/full network outage               <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>◦ Assume it is a malicious (cybersecurity) incident until proven otherwise</li> </ul> </li> <li>• Situational awareness – operational, business, and clinical impacts</li> </ul>
1.2	Establish a cadence and process for coordination with IS/IT and Cyber Security <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consider command center coordination or unified command based on organizational structure (<i>Hospital, IS/IT, and Cybersecurity Command</i>)</li> </ul>
1.3	Activate applicable continuity and downtime plan(s) <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• If plans do not exist or are not functional, rapidly identify critical services and create a plan to continue/sustain services</li> </ul>
1.4	Communicate activation of downtime plans to inform operational changes <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Consider use of overhead paging, mass notification system, etc.</li> </ul>
1.5	Approve recommendations from Operations relative to: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Scaling services</li> <li>• Pausing services</li> <li>• Initiating diversionary status</li> </ul>
1.6	Address incident need by activating additional resources
1.7	Understand upstream and downstream impact(s) to partner organizations. Communicate as appropriate. <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Community Connect</li> <li>• Other health systems</li> <li>• Community partners (e.g., SNF, LTAC, EMS)</li> </ul>
1.8	Establish cadence for ongoing impact assessment and briefing (e.g., operational periods)



## Sentinel Event *Alert*

A complimentary publication of The Joint Commission

Issue 67, Aug. 15, 2023

### Preserving patient safety after a cyberattack

1. Evaluate HVA findings and prioritize hospital services that must be kept operational and safe for an extended downtime.
2. Form a downtime planning committee to develop preparedness actions and mitigations, with representation from all stakeholders.
3. Form a downtime planning committee to develop preparedness actions and mitigations, with representation from all stakeholders.
4. . Designate response teams.
5. Train team leaders, teams, and all staff on how to operate during downtimes.
6. Establish situational awareness with effective communication throughout the organization and with patients and families.
7. After an attack, regroup, evaluate, and make necessary improvements.

**Organize**  
**Collaborate**  
**Promulgate**

***By the Sector for the Sector***

# Health Sector Coordinating Council (HSCC)

- The cross-sector industry coordinating body representing one of 16 critical infrastructure sectors recognized under national policy
- A trust-community partnership convening health providers, companies, non-profits, and industry associations across six subsectors
- Serves as a special “Critical Infrastructure Partnership Advisory Council” to the government, exempt from normal public notification and participation requirements of the Federal Advisory Committee Act, given sensitive homeland security deliberations
- ***Mission: to identify cyber and physical risks to the security and resiliency of the sector, develop guidance for mitigating those risks, and work with government to facilitate threat preparedness and incident response***
- Focused on longer-term critical infrastructure policy and strategy, complementing the operational activities of the Health Information Sharing and Analysis Center

- Largest standing Working Group under the HSCC umbrella
  - 404 private-sector member organizations, including:
    - 47 industry associations
    - 54 non-voting Advisor firms
  - 18 Government organizations, including 11 federal agencies, 3 state agencies, 2 city agencies, and 2 Canadian
  - Total representing personnel: 922
- Identifies and develops strategic, cross-sector solutions to cybersecurity threats and vulnerabilities affecting the security and resiliency of the healthcare sector
- Outcome-oriented task groups meet regularly throughout the year; Full CWG meets twice a year around the country
- Works closely on joint initiatives with:
  - HHS Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response
  - HHS Office of the Chief Information Officer
  - Food and Drug Administration

# 2023 Executive Committee



**CHAIR: Erik Decker, VP - Chief Information Security Officer, Intermountain Healthcare**



**VICE CHAIR: Chris Tyberg, Chief Information Security Officer, Abbott**



**Julian Goldman, MD, Medical Director, Biomedical Engineering, Mass General Brigham**



**Samantha Jacques, Vice President Corporate Clinical Engineering, McLaren Healthcare**



**Leslie A. Saxon, MD, Executive Director, USC Center for Body Computing**



**Janet Scott, Vice President, Business Technology Risk Management and CISO, Organon**



**Leanne Field, PhD, M.S. Clinical Professor & Founding Director, Public Health Program, The University of Texas at Austin**



**Denise Anderson, President & CEO, Health Information Sharing & Analysis Center**



**Jonathan Bagnall Head of Cybersecurity, Digital Service & Solutions – Medical Technology, (CE), Fresenius Medical Care**



**Dr. Adrian Mayers, Vice President, Chief Security Officer, Premera Blue Cross**



**Sanjeev Sah, Vice President, Chief Security Officer, Centura Health**



# Task Groups 2023

- **405(d) HEALTH INDUSTRY CYBERSECURITY PRACTICES (HICP)**

Ongoing enhancement of 405(d) HICP resources

- **5-YEAR PLAN**

Update the Health Care Industry Task Force (HCIC) recommendations as a five-year plan reflecting emerging threat scenarios in a rapidly evolving healthcare system

- **INCIDENT RESPONSE - BUSINESS CONTINUITY**

Develop a healthcare cyber incident response and business continuity plan aligned with existing physical incident response protocols. The first publication on emergency management after the extended cyber-related outage was released in April 2022; the second publication on enterprise incident response plan imminent

- **MEASUREMENT**

Developing methodology for health sector-specific cybersecurity performance goals.

- **POLICY**

Activates as needed for policy proposals and response

- **MEDTECH CONTRACT LANGUAGE**

Updating Model Contract for Cybersecurity MC2) first published March 2022

- **MEDTECH SECURITY DEVELOPMENT (JOINT SECURITY PLAN UPDATE - JSP2)**

Published Medical Device and Health IT Joint Security Plan (JSP); and benchmarking report. Developing updated JSP2.

# Task Groups 2023 (cont.)

- **MEDTECH VULNERABILITY COMMUNICATIONS**

Provide guidance on preparing, receiving, and acting on medical device vulnerability communications. The first publication on patient awareness was released in April 2022. The second version of HDO preparedness is in process.

- **OPERATIONAL TECHNOLOGY MANUFACTURING SECURITY**

Develop best practices guide for securing OT manufacturing networks for healthcare manufacturing subsectors.

- **OUTREACH & AWARENESS**

Develop tools and strategies for enhancing visibility and messaging the imperative of healthcare cybersecurity, HSCC CWG, and its resources.

- **PRIVACY-SECURITY COLLABORATION**

Facilitate the interdependence of security and privacy risk to confidentiality, integrity, and availability of entity systems, data, etc., in patient safety and care.

- **PUBLIC HEALTH**

Identify strategies for strengthening the cybersecurity and resilience of SLTT public health agencies with the support of private sector and academic organizations.

- **RISK ASSESSMENT**

Published with HHS the NIST Cyber Framework Implementation guide; follow-on marketing and effort to measure adoption

# HSCC CYBERSECURITY WORKING GROUP

## Publications, 2019-2023

SEE: <https://healthsectorcouncil.org/hsc-publications>

### 2023

- [Reprint Tactical Crisis Response Guide](#)
- [Updated Updated Health Industry Cybersecurity Information Sharing Best Practices \(HIC-ISBP\)](#)
- [Updated Health Industry Cybersecurity Matrix of Information Sharing Organizations \(HIC-MISO\)](#)
- [Coordinated Healthcare Incident Response Plan](#)
- [Recommended Government Policy & Programs](#)
- [Hospital Cyber Landscape Analysis \(Joint HSCC/HHS\)](#)
- [Prioritized Recognized Cybersecurity Practices](#)
- [Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices 2023 \(Joint\)](#)
- [Cybersecurity for Clinician Video Training Series](#)
- [Health Industry NIST CSF Implementation Guide \(Joint\)](#)
- [Managing Legacy Technology Security](#)
- [Artificial Intelligence Machine Learning](#)

### 2022

- [Operational Continuity-Cyber Incident Checklist](#)

### 2022

- [MedTech Vulnerability Communications Toolkit](#)
- [Model Contract-Language for Medtech Cybersecurity](#)

### 2021

- [Securing Telehealth and Telemedicine](#)

### 2020

- [Supply Chain Risk Management](#)
- [Health Sector Return-to-Work Guidance](#)
- [Tactical Crisis Response](#)
- [Protection of Innovation Capital](#)
- [Information Sharing Best Practices](#)
- [Checklist for Teleworking Surge During COVID-19](#)

### 2019

- [Matrix of Information Sharing Organizations](#)
- [Workforce Guide](#)
- [Medical Device and Health IT Joint Security Plan](#)
- [Health Industry Cybersecurity Practices](#)

# Cybersecurity for the Clinician Video Training Series



# Health Sector Cybersecurity Five-Year Strategic Plan

**Five years after the publication of the 2017 HHS-Health Care Industry Cybersecurity Task Force report found healthcare cybersecurity to be in “critical condition”:**

- Identify the HCIC recommendations that the HSCC Cybersecurity Working Group publications have addressed, and which remain a priority for CWG and sector attention;
- Assess how identified healthcare industry trends over the next five years may present continued or emerging cybersecurity challenges to the sector;
- Recommend how the industry and government should prepare for those changes, with a measurable vision of what “Stable Condition” looks like in 2029; and
- Prescribe specific initiatives and tactics that the CWG and government must do as a public-private partnership to motivate and facilitate the achievement of those preparedness objectives.



# Questions



# Contact


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***Get Involved***



[\*HSCC Website Link\*](#)