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12
13 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**
14 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

15
16 CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION,
a California non-profit organization,

17 Plaintiff,

18 v.

19 CITY OF INGLEWOOD, a charter
20 municipality,

21 Defendant.

Case No. 2:23-cv-6187

**COMPLAINT FOR
DECLARATORY AND
INJUNCTIVE RELIEF**

22
23 **COMPLAINT**

24 Plaintiff California Hospital Association (“Plaintiff” or “CHA”) brings this
25 action for declaratory relief against Defendant City of Inglewood (“Defendant” or
26 “City”) that certain provisions of its Healthcare Workers Minimum Wage Ordinance
27 (the “Ordinance”) are invalid and unconstitutional, and seeks a permanent injunction
28 prohibiting enforcement of such provisions.

INTRODUCTION

1
2 1. The National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) reflects a comprehensive
3 federal labor policy governing labor organizing and collective bargaining in the
4 private sector. While the NLRA expressly regulates certain conduct of employers,
5 employees, and labor unions, the Supreme Court has recognized that Congress also
6 intentionally left some activities in the labor arena unregulated by the NLRA, to be
7 controlled by the free play of economic forces. Thus, when a state or local law
8 interferes with those zones of activity that Congress deliberately left unregulated, it
9 is preempted by the NLRA.

10 2. Here, the City’s Ordinance restricts the actions of healthcare employers
11 in ways that disrupt the carefully crafted balance of power between management and
12 labor that the NLRA prescribes. To be sure, the Ordinance does much more than just
13 increase the minimum wage for healthcare workers. It also bars healthcare employers
14 from reducing staffing, altering schedules, or adjusting employee compensation and
15 benefits. The Ordinance forecloses any option by a Healthcare Worker to opt out of
16 the Ordinance or its protections thereby necessarily interfering with the collective
17 bargaining process. Further, the Ordinance creates a new private cause of action that
18 displaces agreed-upon grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements, and
19 it prevents healthcare employers from utilizing standard economic weapons of the
20 collective bargaining process, such as lockouts or the hiring of permanent
21 replacements. The provisions of the Ordinance containing these restrictions are
22 preempted by the NLRA.

23 3. The City’s Ordinance is nothing more than a union-promoted private
24 interest boon cloaked in public interest sentiment. Indeed, the Ordinance is not a
25 generally applicable labor regulation for all, but rather the product of a decade-long
26 strategy by the Service Employees International Union – United Healthcare Workers
27 West (“SEIU-UHW” or “Union”) to target hospital employers. Here, the Union is
28 once again using the ballot initiative process to gain leverage during collective

1 bargaining or simply to circumvent the bargaining process altogether—to the
2 detriment of the hospitals, their employees and the communities they serve.

3 **JURISDICTION AND VENUE**

4 4. The Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to 28
5 U.S.C. § 1331 because CHA’s claim arises under the National Labor Relations Act,
6 29 U.S.C. § 141 *et seq.*, and Article VI of the United States Constitution, which
7 designates the Constitution and Laws of the United States as the supreme law of the
8 land.

9 5. Venue is proper in this Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(2) because the
10 events giving rise to CHA’s claim occurred in this District.

11 **THE PARTIES**

12 6. Plaintiff California Hospital Association represents more than 400
13 hospitals throughout California. Established in 1935, CHA advocates on behalf of
14 its member hospitals on important policy issues that affect 40 million Californians.
15 CHA works to ensure that hospitals will continue to be able to provide exceptional
16 care to patients and comprehensive health services to communities.

17 7. CHA brings this action on behalf of its members—including members
18 operating within the City of Inglewood—that have suffered, and will continue to
19 suffer, a direct and adverse impact from the application of the Ordinance and thus
20 would have standing to pursue this claim in their own right. The policy and legal
21 interests CHA seeks to protect are at the core of its mission, and the declaratory and
22 injunctive relief sought does not require the participation of any individual member.

23 8. Defendant, City of Inglewood, is and at all relevant times has been a
24 public entity duly organized and existing under and by virtue of the laws of the State
25 of California as a charter municipality.

26 **FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

27 **The Union Has a History of Using Initiatives to Circumvent Bargaining**

28 9. For over a decade, SEIU-UHW has used the ballot initiative process to

1 try to gain leverage in collective bargaining with California hospitals or to circumvent
2 the collective bargaining process altogether. The Union has a history of filing ballot
3 measures that target organizations whose workers it represents or wants to represent.

4 10. Many of the initiatives never actually make it to the ballot because the
5 Union drops them after the initiatives serve their purpose as leverage in negotiations.
6 In 2011, for example, the SEIU-UHW filed two statewide initiatives that would have
7 implemented pricing caps and charity care floors, i.e., minimum amounts hospitals
8 must spend on free or discounted medical care, for various healthcare facilities. The
9 Union dropped the ballot initiatives after reaching an agreement with Plaintiff.

10 11. Likewise, in 2013, SEIU-UHW filed statewide initiatives related to
11 pricing and executive compensation. The Union withdrew the initiatives after
12 entering into a Code of Conduct agreement with Plaintiff. The Union further agreed
13 not to file initiatives adverse to California hospitals during the Code of Conduct's
14 effective term.

15 12. Apparently dissatisfied with the Code of Conduct, SEIU-UHW
16 breached its terms and filed another statewide executive compensation initiative for
17 placement on the 2016 ballot. Plaintiff enforced its agreement with the Union in
18 arbitration, with a court ultimately forcing the Union to withdraw the initiative. *See*
19 *Order Confirming Arbitration Award, California Hospital Association v. SEIU,*
20 *United Healthcare Workers West*, No. 34-301-00189567 (Sac. Cty. Super. Ct. June
21 24, 2016).

22 13. In 2017, after Stanford Health Care refused the Union's demand for
23 "neutrality" (which would have enabled the Union to freely recruit hospital staff and
24 expand its membership at Stanford), the Union filed initiatives aimed at capping
25 hospital charges in five cities (Palo Alto, Redwood City, Emeryville, Pleasanton, and
26 Livermore) in which Stanford operates. Only the initiatives in Palo Alto and
27 Livermore reached the ballot, and both were defeated by voters.

28 14. Stanford filed an unfair labor practice charge against the Union in 2019.

1 The NLRB referred the charge to the General Counsel, who concluded that the
2 Union’s “threat to maintain ballot initiatives made during the negotiations appears to
3 have risen to the level of unlawful insistence,” meaning the Union used “restraint,
4 coercion or otherwise manifest bad faith” tactics to insist on a term—here, neutrality
5 to help expand its membership at Stanford—that is not a mandatory subject of
6 collective bargaining. The General Counsel nevertheless dismissed the charge as
7 time-barred. Advice Memorandum, Case 32-CB-234643 (Oct. 17, 2019).

8 15. In 2021, the Union began its campaign for a healthcare-specific
9 minimum wage, which led to the Ordinance at issue here. The Union filed initiatives
10 in ten cities within Los Angeles County and also began pursuing a statewide
11 minimum wage initiative with similar terms to the local initiatives. The initiatives
12 succeeded in Inglewood via a ballot measure on November 8, 2022, and in Lynwood
13 via a City Council vote in February 2023. Several other minimum wage initiatives
14 are set to be voted on in the March 2024 primary election.

15 16. In May and June 2023, the Union filed healthcare minimum wage and
16 executive compensation initiatives in three cities in San Diego County—Chula Vista,
17 La Mesa, and San Diego. The Union also filed an executive compensation initiative
18 in Los Angeles that is headed to the ballot in March 2024. In addition, the Union
19 supported the presentation of an identical healthcare minimum wage ordinance in
20 Sacramento.

21 17. On April 11, 2023, the Union sued CHA member Centinela Hospital in
22 the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles (Case No. 23STCV08047) under
23 the Ordinance for (1) reducing the hours of work of covered employees allegedly to
24 fund and/or offset the costs associated with the wage increases required by the
25 Ordinance, and (2) laying off certain SEIU-UHW members in alleged retaliation for
26 these members’ participation in the public campaign to pass the Ordinance. The
27 Union’s complaint admits the Union views the Ordinance as benefiting the Union,
28 rather than individual workers, seeking attorneys’ fees on the basis that Centinela

1 Hospital’s “disregard for the law has forced [the Union] to obtain legal counsel to
2 secure a victory they already achieved at the ballot box in November.” Compl. ¶ 50.

3 **The Ordinance Extends Far Beyond a Minimum Wage**

4 18. The Ordinance codified in Chapter 8-150 of the Inglewood Municipal
5 Code is attached hereto as **Exhibit A**.

6 19. The Ordinance states its “purpose is to establish a minimum wage for
7 covered healthcare workers within the City of Inglewood,” which “will help address
8 retention challenges and workforce shortages affecting healthcare facilities in
9 Inglewood” and “fairly compensate healthcare workers for their contributions and
10 sacrifices.” Section 8-150. The Ordinance explains that healthcare workers across
11 the board are experiencing stress and burnout, exacerbated by rising housing costs
12 that require workers to live further from their places of work. Section 8-150.

13 20. The Ordinance applies to “Healthcare Worker[s]” whose primary work
14 assignment is to “provide patient care, healthcare services, or services supporting the
15 provision of healthcare” at a Covered Healthcare Facility. Section 8-151(f). This
16 broad definition includes “a clinician, professional, non-professional, nurse, certified
17 nursing assistant, aide, technician, maintenance worker, janitorial or housekeeping
18 staffperson, groundskeeper, guard, food service worker, laundry worker, pharmacist,
19 nonmanagerial administrative worker and business office clerical worker.” Section
20 8-151(f). The definition “does not include a manager or supervisor.” Section 8-
21 151(f).

22 21. A “Covered Healthcare Facility” means a “licensed general acute care
23 hospital,” a “licensed acute psychiatric hospital,” a “clinic . . . that is conducted,
24 operated, or maintained as an outpatient department of a general acute care hospital
25 or acute psychiatric hospital,” a “licensed chronic dialysis clinic,” a “licensed
26 psychiatric health facility,” and “[a]ll facilities that are part of an Integrated
27 Healthcare Delivery System.” Section 8-151(b).

28 22. An “Integrated Healthcare Delivery System” is a system that includes

1 “(1) one or more hospitals *and* (2) Covered Physician Groups, health care service
2 plans, medical foundation clinics, or other facilities or entities, where the hospital or
3 hospitals and other entities are related” through contract or shared ownership.

4 23. The definition of Covered Healthcare Facility notably excludes many
5 other healthcare facilities, such as community clinics and skilled nursing facilities,
6 that are substantially similar to the covered facilities in every material way relevant
7 to the Ordinance, which also employ healthcare workers experiencing increased
8 stress, burnout, and increased housing costs.

9 24. The Ordinance entitles covered Healthcare Workers to a minimum wage
10 of \$25 per hour, a 60% increase over the current state minimum wage of \$15.50.
11 Section 8-152(a)-(b). Notably, a statewide bill—SB 525—providing for a \$25
12 minimum wage for healthcare workers by June 1, 2025, recently passed the
13 California Senate and has moved to the State Assembly.¹ The Union takes credit for
14 advancing SB 525. See [https://www.seiu-uhw.org/fair-wages-for-healthcare-](https://www.seiu-uhw.org/fair-wages-for-healthcare-workers/)
15 [workers/](https://www.seiu-uhw.org/fair-wages-for-healthcare-workers/) (“If we wait for our employers alone to take action to solve the staffing
16 crisis, nothing will change. We have to use every tool at our disposal — including
17 political action — to tackle this crisis.”).

18 25. The Inglewood Ordinance not only establishes a minimum wage,
19 however, but also forbids Covered Healthcare Facilities from using various lawful
20 bargaining tools when engaged in collective bargaining with unions.

21 26. The Ordinance provides that an “Employer may not fund the Minimum
22 Wage increases required by this Article in any of the following ways: (1) Reducing
23 Healthcare Workers’ premium pay rates or shift differentials; (2) Reducing vacation,
24 healthcare, or other non-wage benefits of any Healthcare Worker; (3) Reducing
25 Healthcare Workers’ hours of work; (4) Laying off Healthcare Workers; or
26 (5) Increasing charges to any Healthcare Worker for parking, work-related materials

27 ¹
28 https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billNavClient.xhtml?bill_id=202320240SB5

1 or equipment.” Section 8-152(c).

2 27. Employers violate the Ordinance “if the Minimum Wage requirements
3 of this Article are *a motivating factor* in the Employer’s decision to take any of the
4 actions described in [the previous paragraph].” Section 8-152(d). The Ordinance
5 shifts the burden to the Employer to “prove[] that it would have taken the same action
6 at the time that it did irrespective of the operation of this Article.” Section 8-152(d).

7 28. The Ordinance also creates a cause of action for retaliation: “No
8 Employer shall discharge, terminate a contract with, reduce compensation to, or
9 otherwise discriminate against or take adverse action against any Healthcare Worker
10 for opposing any practice proscribed by this Article, for participating in proceedings
11 related to this Article, for seeking to enforce rights under this Article by any lawful
12 means, or for otherwise asserting rights under this Article.” Section 8-153.

13 29. The Ordinance further establishes a rebuttable presumption that “any
14 adverse action against a Healthcare Worker within 90 days of the Healthcare
15 Worker’s exercise of rights protected under this Article” was taken “in retaliation for
16 the exercise of such rights.” Section 8-153.

17 30. The Ordinance creates a private right of action for Healthcare Workers,
18 “a representative of a Healthcare Worker” (i.e., the Union), and the City Attorney to
19 sue an employer for alleged violations of the Ordinance. Section 8-155(d). For
20 claims of retaliation, the Ordinance entitles prevailing parties to treble damages.
21 Section 8-155(d). The Ordinance further entitles “the City, a Healthcare Worker, or
22 a representative of a Healthcare Worker” who prevails in the action to recover
23 attorneys’ fees and costs, but does not provide the same for a prevailing defendant.
24 Section 8-155(d).

25 31. The Ordinance makes any attempt by a Healthcare Worker to waive the
26 “rights or protections afforded under the authority of this Article” void and
27 unenforceable as “contrary to public policy.” Section 8-156.

28 32. The Ordinance has no expiration date. It is a permanent, not temporary,

1 enactment.

2 **The Ordinance Interferes With The Collective Bargaining Process**

3 33. Collective bargaining is the process through which an employer and a
4 union negotiate to reach an agreement—the collective bargaining agreement
5 (CBA)—that will govern salaries and wages, hours, working conditions, and
6 benefits. The NLRA requires an employer and a union that represents its employees
7 to meet at reasonable times to confer in good faith concerning these matters. The
8 parties are entitled to resort to certain economic tools, like a strike or lockout, to apply
9 pressure on the opposing party to agree to certain demands. Resort to economic
10 weapons during collective bargaining is the right of the employer as well as the
11 employee.

12 34. The Ordinance prohibits employers from using such bargaining tools as
13 laying off workers, reducing hours of work, reducing premium pay rates or shift
14 differentials, reducing non-wage benefits like vacation or healthcare, or increasing
15 charges to any healthcare worker for parking or work-related materials or equipment
16 if the wage increases are “a motivating factor” for that action.

17 35. As a practical matter, a plaintiff will always be able to allege that the
18 minimum wage requirements are a motivating factor for these decisions. Requiring
19 an employer to spend more money on wages necessarily means the employer has less
20 money to spend in other areas of compensation. And the increase in wages is not
21 limited to the difference between an employee’s current hourly rate and \$25.
22 Employers will face pressure to adjust the hourly rate of more senior or skilled
23 employees even higher to account for wage scales and to avoid wage compression.

24 36. For example, Centinela Hospital Medical Center—one of Plaintiff’s
25 member hospitals operating in Inglewood—has a CBA with the Union that places
26 “[a]ll new hires ... on the wage scale based on years of experience and or license.”
27 Additionally, this CBA also provides for the payment of shift differentials at
28 Centinela Hospital (\$2.22 per hour for evening shifts and \$1.24 per hour for weekend

1 shifts).

2 37. Layoffs, reductions in premium pay rates, reductions in non-wage
3 benefits, reductions in hours, and increased charges are consequences of an employer
4 having less money to spend—which will necessarily be the case given the significant
5 increase in spending on wages due to the minimum wage. By explicitly forbidding
6 employers from using money spent on other areas of compensation to pay for wages,
7 the ordinance effectively forbids reducing any aspect of compensation for any
8 covered employees.

9 38. This effective prohibition of changes to covered employee
10 compensation interferes with collective bargaining.

11 39. The Ordinance handcuffs management in their negotiations of any
12 aspect of compensation. For example, if a union bargains for above-minimum wage
13 pay, an employer could not negotiate lower hours, reduced non-wage benefits, or
14 increased charges to employees in exchange without risking a lawsuit alleging that
15 the minimum wage floor is a motivating factor for its positions. The Ordinance
16 removes most, if not all, aspects of compensation from the bargaining process.
17 Indeed, the Ordinance handcuffs unions, too, as Section 8-156 would prevent a union
18 that preferred reduced hours from exempting such a reduction from the Ordinance.

19 40. The Ordinance thus disrupts matters that are routinely subject to
20 negotiation. Centinela Hospital’s CBA with the Union, for example, reflects
21 management’s rights to “create, change, combine or abolish jobs in departments and
22 facilities in whole or in part,” “increase or decrease the work force,” “determine
23 working hours, shift assignments, and days off,” and “specify or assign work
24 requirements and overtime.” The parties to the CBA “acknowledge the common goal
25 of providing employment and security to employees,” while recognizing “there are
26 circumstances where avoiding displacement cannot be achieved.” The CBA
27 explicitly contemplates the possibility for a reduction in force, setting forth detailed
28 “steps” to be “followed in order to determine placement of the affected

1 Employee(s).” Again, the City’s Ordinance interferes with all of these negotiated
2 provisions.

3 41. The Ordinance also prevents employers from taking lawful self-help
4 actions during collective bargaining. One of an employer’s most powerful
5 bargaining tools is a lockout. In a lockout, an employer temporarily withholds
6 available work and access to facilities from its regular employees to apply economic
7 pressure on employees and their unions to accept the employer’s proposals in
8 collective bargaining, deprive employees and unions of exclusive control over the
9 timing and duration of work stoppages, and anticipate threatened or imminent strike
10 activity. The City’s Ordinance prevents employers from engaging in lockouts
11 motivated in any way by the minimum wage because they necessarily involve
12 reducing employees’ “hours of work.” Section 8-152(c).

13 42. The City’s Ordinance also interferes with an employer’s right to hire
14 permanent replacements, another economic weapon available to employers in
15 bargaining. Any hiring of permanent replacements would simply lead to a still larger
16 workforce, with each employee receiving at least the minimum wage, while the
17 employer would be prohibited by the Ordinance from laying off any workers on
18 account of the increased costs attributable to that minimum wage.

19 43. Moreover, collective bargaining agreements routinely contain agreed-
20 upon grievance procedures for resolving disputes out of court. But again, the City’s
21 Ordinance creates economic protections and enforcement provisions that favor the
22 Union. Thus, the Ordinance displaces the parties’ agreed-upon dispute resolution
23 procedures, including mandatory arbitration, in favor of litigation.

24 44. For example, Centinela Hospital’s CBA includes detailed, step-by-step
25 procedures for resolving “staffing” disputes or any “dispute as to the interpretation,
26 meaning or application of a specific provision of this Agreement.” The grievance
27 procedures include informal verbal efforts at resolution, reducing complaints to
28 writing, and ultimately arbitration if informal efforts are unsuccessful. As described

1 above, the CBA covers issues relating to reductions in force, benefits, premium pay
2 and shift differentials, and charges to employees. Disputes regarding the CBA’s
3 application to any of those matters should be resolved via the parties’ informal
4 grievance procedures and, if unsuccessful, mandatory arbitration.

5 45. Yet the City’s Ordinance creates a new cause of action to be filed in
6 court for complaints involving the very matters covered by this CBA—e.g., hours,
7 benefits, and termination. The Ordinance also effectively places the burden of proof
8 on an employer to demonstrate a lack of a violation. And the Ordinance introduces
9 treble damages, attorneys’ fees, and other remedies for the benefit of the Union that
10 are unavailable under the parties’ CBA.

11 46. The City’s Ordinance contains no mechanism to avoid the applicability
12 of its terms and permit the collective bargaining process to play out. While the
13 Ordinance provides a “One-Year Court-Granted Waiver” from its requirements if
14 compliance would risk bankrupting an employer and its parent company, it does not
15 include an opt-out for CBAs and prohibits waivers.

16 47. Moreover, the City’s Ordinance targets certain employers to the
17 exclusion of others, despite purporting to help *all* healthcare workers. Again, the
18 Ordinance purports to advance broad public interest, but reveals itself as nothing
19 more than a Union-promoted private interest. The Union’s concerted campaign to
20 pursue initiatives in cities where it represents bargaining units evidences this fact.
21 The Union gerrymandered the definition of “Covered Healthcare Facilities” to target
22 employers with which the Union wanted increased leverage and exclude those other
23 healthcare employers that the Union is uninterested in disrupting. In Inglewood, for
24 example, the definition excludes community clinics and skilled nursing facilities,
25 although employees at those facilities have no less “stress,” “burnout,” and “rising
26 housing costs” than employees of the covered entities. Section 8-150. The only
27 difference is the relative benefit *to the Union*.

28 48. Indeed, the challenged provisions of the Ordinance promote employees’

1 *collective*, not *individual*, interests. While the minimum wage provision protects
2 individual workers by ensuring that each employee receives a minimum wage, the
3 challenged provisions here seek only to promote employees' interests collectively by
4 prohibiting employers from reducing *any* employee's premium pay rates, shift
5 differentials, benefits, or hours of work, laying off *any* employee, or increasing
6 charges to *any* employee to offset the costs of complying with the minimum wage.

7 49. These provisions do not establish mandatory minimum standards that
8 benefit individuals. For example, the City's Ordinance does not establish a minimum
9 number of hours a worker must receive each month, a minimum threshold of non-
10 wage benefits, or a maximum amount of employee charges. These provisions instead
11 promote employees' collective interests, disrupting the collective bargaining process.

12 50. Similarly, the City's Ordinance promotes collective interests by
13 creating private rights of action for worker representatives. And SEIU-UHW has
14 already taken advantage of these provisions to sue a hospital operating in Inglewood
15 for decisions affecting the broader workforce on the theory that this type of
16 operational decision-making is motivated by the City's Ordinance.

17 51. As a whole, the City's Ordinance is an extreme regulation that is so
18 operationally invasive and detailed so as to alter the balance of power between
19 management and labor and dictate the results of the bargaining process.

20 **CAUSE OF ACTION**

21 **NLRA Preemption**

22 **(29 U.S.C. § 151, *et seq.*)**

23 52. Plaintiff incorporates by reference all preceding paragraphs as though
24 fully set forth therein.

25 53. Enacted in 1935, the NLRA, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 151, *et seq.*,
26 creates a uniform federal body of law governing union organizing, collective
27 bargaining, and labor-management relations for employers engaged in interstate
28 commerce.

1 54. The NLRA strikes a deliberate balance of protection, prohibition, and
2 laissez-faire with respect to union organization, collective bargaining, and labor
3 disputes. It thus preempts any and all state and local enactments that, by design or
4 consequence, regulate or interfere with those zones of activity that, under federal
5 labor law, are intended to be left to the free play of economic forces.

6 55. For example, the NLRA intentionally leaves unregulated economic
7 tools available to labor or management during the course of collective bargaining,
8 including the ability to engage in lockouts. The NLRA also reserves for employers
9 the ability to hire and fire employees. The parties' agreed-upon grievance procedures
10 are also protected from interference. The NLRA intended to allow the parties to
11 resolve these matters without the unsettling effect of state regulation.

12 56. Sections 8-152(c)–(d) of the Ordinance intrude upon zones of activity
13 reserved under the NLRA to the free play of economic forces by prohibiting
14 employers from reducing any employee's premium pay rates, shift differentials,
15 benefits, or hours of work, laying off any employees, or increasing charges to any
16 employees to offset the costs of complying with the minimum wage. This conduct
17 is often central to CBA negotiations and the NLRA intended to allow the parties to
18 resolve these matters without the unsettling effect of local regulation.

19 57. Sections 8-153 and 8-155(d) of the Ordinance provide unions with new
20 causes of action and evidentiary presumptions that interfere with the grievance
21 procedures governed by CBAs. In doing so, these provisions regulate the mechanics
22 of labor dispute resolution. By displacing CBAs' substantive grievance procedures
23 with economic protections and enforcement provisions favoring the Union in
24 disputes involving hours, benefits, and termination, the Ordinance interferes with the
25 objectives of the NLRA.

26 58. Section 8-156 enshrines the interference with the collective bargaining
27 process by preventing any Healthcare Worker—and, by extension, any union—from
28 opting out of, or waiving, application of the Ordinance.

1 59. Sections 8-152(c)–(d), 8-153, 8-155(d), and 8-156 of the Ordinance are
2 extreme regulations benefiting workers as members of a collective organization that
3 are so invasive and detailed as to alter the balance of power between management
4 and labor and dictate the results of the bargaining process contrary to the NLRA.

5 60. CHA is entitled to judgment declaring Section 8-152(c)–(d), Section 8-
6 153, Section 8-155(d), and Section 8-156 of the Ordinance to be void and
7 unenforceable and injunctive relief to prevent enforcement of these provisions.

8 **PRAYER FOR RELIEF**

9 WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for the following relief:

10 1. A judgment declaring that Section 8-152(c)–(d), Section 8-153, Section
11 8-155(d), and Section 8-156 of the Ordinance, as well as any act taken in furtherance
12 of these provisions by any person, are void and unenforceable because they are
13 preempted by the National Labor Relations Act and its implementing regulations and
14 guidance;

15 2. A permanent injunction enjoining the City from enforcing or taking any
16 action under the Ordinance;

17 3. Attorneys’ fees, costs, and interest; and

18 4. Such other and further relief as the Court may deem just and proper.

19 Dated: July 31, 2023

JONES DAY

21 By: /s/ Matthew J. Silveira
22 Matthew J. Silveira

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24 CALIFORNIA HOSPITAL
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